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Recent Cases of the Progressive City
Pierre Clavel
Wliat makes a city "progressive"? In this article Pierre Clavel defines a progressive city by documenting recent
cases in cities across the country. Two dimensions underlie theprogressive city movement: the desireforgreater
citizen participation and the desirefor redistribution of wealth. Clavel describes how these dimensions were
translated into successfulprogram initiatives in cities such as Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Chicago.
American city government--a national embarassment in
the nineteenth century-had a rebirth in the progressive
era. Reacting to strong currents of activism in labor,
feminist, socialist and other movements at the turn of the
century, liberal politicians experimented with public own-
ership of transit and power companies, and invented city
planning, zoning, capital budgeting and the city manager
system as instruments of reform.
Recent History of Progressive City Government
There has also been a recent history of the progressive
city. Despite the rightward shift in national politics since
1968, there has been a series of local experiments in which
populist coalitions, rooted in mass movements, have moved
city politics and city administration to the left. These move-
ments included the neighborhood movement, the rent
control movement, the development of the Rainbow Coa-
lition in Boston, and in some places, black and minority
movements such as the Task Force for Black Political
Empowerment in Chicago in 1983. In the past two decades
progressive government was evident in cities across the
country:
• In Hartford,. Connecticut, Mayor Nick Carbone fol-
lowed a populist program over a ten year period in the
1970s.
• In Cleveland, Ohio, Dennis Kucinich became mayor for
a term in 1977 by opposing tax abatements for down-
town projects.
• in Burlington, Vermont, Bernard Sanders became mayor
in 1981 and put together a set of redistributive policies
that won him four consecutive terms. In 1988 his
successor, Peter Clavelle, followed with a new set ofpro-
gressive initiatives.
• In Berkeley, California, Berkeley Citizens Action (BCA)
dominated the city agenda through the 1970s with
(1) proposals to acquire the power company and decen-
tralize the police, and (2) successful referenda for rent
control and referenda to open the appointive boards.
BCA controlled city council through most ofthe 1980s.
• In Santa Monica, California, a rent control coalition
won power in 1981 and passed both the strongest rent
control law in the country and a construction morato-
rium. This coalition also controlled city council through
most of the 1980s.
• In Boston, the 1983 election mobilized a rainbow coali-
tion led by Mel King. Ultimately, Raymond Flynn was
elected mayor. His neighborhood-oriented agenda
featured a linkage ordinance and numerous affordable
housing initiatives.
• And, in Chicago, Harold Washington became the first
black mayor and dismembered the Daley machine. He
enacted a neighborhood-oriented economic develop-
ment program that was one of the most remarkable
anywhere until his death in 1987 and his eventual suc-
cession by the young Richard Daley in 1989.
Progressive Programs
What did these places actually do? It is possible to
describe their policy initiatives as having two dimensions.
On the one hand, it was part of their program to replace the
sometimes managerialist, oligarchical structure of repre-
sentation with more participatory forms. They opened up
city government in ways ranging from broadcasting city
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"With varying degrees ofsuccess, progressive city governments
tried to open government to greater citizen participation.
"
council meetings to a drastic restructuring of citizen board
appointments as in Berkeley. On the other hand, these
cities devised elaborate administrative schemes, often re-
distributive in intent, to deliver services and redistribute
wealth.
The two dimensions are independent in practice, though
tied by ideology. It is possible to pursue substantive pro-
grams through administrative measures that are some-
times contrary to participation; widespread participation
may at times block program adoption. Nevertheless, the
two dimensions are linked by doctrine; redistribution of
wealth and redistribution of political power to the people
are seen as caus-
ally linked, and
so progressive
cities push on
both fronts, de-
spite tensions
between the
two dimensions in the short run.
Examples best elaborate these program initiatives. With
varying degrees of success, progressive city governments
frequently tried to open government to greater citizen
participation. There was good reason for this; the regimes
they replaced tended to control and adapt to representa-
tive-and often restrictive-institutions such as the city
manager or various city council procedures. It was in the
interest of the progressive coalitions, which depended on
mass mobilization, to create new channels of access that
their supporters could identify with and use. The new
participatory channels ranged from the mundane-broad-
casting city council meetings on the radio-to the more
dramatic-such as voter initiatives with great emotional
appeal such as rent control in Santa Monica and Berkeley.
Participation: Berkeley's Fair Representation Ordinance
Berkeley's Fair Representation Ordinance, passed as a
ballot initiative in 1975, illustrates a successful measure to
increase participation. Berkeley's city council had a some-
what restricted role under its city manager system of gov-
ernment. For example, city department heads were under
instructions not to communicate with city council members
except through the city manager. And, city council delib-
erations were restricted, formally at least, to broad policy
questions posed by the administration. Moreover, ap-
pointments to a large number of citizen boards and com-
missions, which covered topics ranging from city planning
to housing to library administration, were made by the
majority leadership of the city council. Berkeley Citizens
Action (BCA), in the minority on the council, felt shut out
of the process, even though it had many members who
wanted to serve.
The proposed ordinance aimed to open participation on
these boards and commissions. Provisions ofthe ordinance
included changing the size ofeach board and commission to
multiples the size of the city council-nine, eighteen, twenty-
seven and so on. Each council member would personally
appoint an equal number to each board, thus the appoint-
ment authority would be decentralized from the council
majority to the council members. Objections included the
fear that the boards and commissions would become "par-
tisan": there was enough fighting on city council, it was
argued; and city government, particularly the appointive
boards, should instead present opportunities for problem-
solving. Otherwise, people would not serve on the boards,
or at least, the best people would not serve.
The ordi-
nance passed,
perhaps partly
on grounds of
political theory,
for the choices
implied above
are basic to the conceptions we have of citizenship, the ap-
propriateness of conflict, and whether local government
needs to represent the interests involved. But the outcome
was also practical. By making personal appointments, city
council members reported satisfaction that they became
more knowledgeable with the problems dealt with by the
boards. Further, board appointees felt they had access to a
city council member, making their work more meaningful
since the connection between board issues and council
issues was clarified. Despite earlier fears, the board delib-
erations did not become more contentious, possibly be-
causeboard issues tend to be less politically salient than city
council issues.
What resulted was a general opening of city government
as a result of the Fair Representation Ordinance. Informa-
tion, which had been repressed under the city manager
system-and perhaps even more so under the contentious
atmosphere created by the times and BCA's appearance-
now flowed more freely.
Redistribution with Participation:
Santa Monica 's Task Forces
By the end of the 1970s, Santa Monica was heavily im-
pacted by investment and development pressures. From
1970 to 1980, rents more than doubled and the cost of the
average single-family house sptraled from $36,300 to $189,000.
Santa Monica, arguably in one of the best locations in the
hottest real estate market in the world, was enormously
attractive to speculative development. A number of large
projects were in the planning stages. Based on past experi-
ence, itwas clear that the projects would burden the largely
middle-class population. The projects would demolish af-
fordable housing, and possibly, neighborhood stores and
services. Expensive units would replace affordable housing
and the influx ofhigher income renterswould competewith
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existing residents for services, driving up the cost while
demolitions had reduced the supply.
This pressure was the main factor behind the success of
SantaMonicansforRenters Rights, the coalition that passed
a strong rent control initiative in 1979, and swept to a
majority control of the city council in 1981. The coalition
ran on a platform which included a pledge to impose a
moratorium on development. At the first council meeting,
the coalition pushed an immediate six month moratorium
on all construction projects and appointed three citizen
task forces to consider how developments could be placed
under city control on a permanent basis.
The task forces met during the summer of 1981 and in-
cluded representa-
tives of develop-
"It was in the interest of the progressive coalitions, which
depended on mass mobilization, to create new channels of
access that their supporters could identify with and use.
"
ers and other af-
fected parties.
Members of the
city council and
concerned citizens
attended the meet-
ings. Citizen opinion tended to be very critical toward the
developers, verging on a "no development" stance. Even-
tually the give and take evolved into a plan for "develop-
ment agreements." In a development agreement a city will
give permission to a developer to exceed zoning densities,
for example, in return for contributions to mitigate the im-
posed costs. Task force meetings then turned to the ques-
tion of the amount the city might ask for. Fortunately, the
legal limits were well researched and broad, so it was
negotiated in each case. The task force could press hard,
and the developers could claim the limits of profitability.
The discussions became sufficiently heated for one devel-
oper to complain of "legalized extortion." At the same
time, one citycouncil member complained of"never know-
inghow much to ask-whenever the developer agreed, there
was the implication that the city had asked for too little."
In the end, the task forces made no agreements. Negotia-
tions shifted away from the task force setting between
developer and city council to the new city manager who
took office in the fall. Three major agreements were made
during this period. In each case Santa Monica got major
concessions for on-site services and affordable housing, or
payments to an affordable-housing fund. Santa Monica
was later cited as one of three major cities, along with
Boston and San Francisco, for adopting "linked develop-
ment" policies.
Three procedural elements helped create this policy.
First, the coalition had a mandate and found an effective
way to impress that mandate on developers and the com-
munity at large through the task force meetings. There was
an element of threat involved, since no one knew how
restrictive the city council could become; the coalition had
swept the council seats in the recent election and the task
force meetings were crowded with citizens testifying to the
harm caused by development. Against this background, the
developers' usual arguments-invoking the ideology of free
enterprise or the threat of pulling out investments-were
ineffective.
Second, the city was able to implement the mandate with
stable administrative action and negotiation through the
city council and the new city manager, both ofwhom were
able to project an image of firm yet consistent policy. De-
velopers and the business community fulminated and com-
plained, but in the end they were able to do business with
the city.
Third, over time a learning process occurred on both
sides. Some of the
citizens and city
council members
who engaged in
the task force and
development
agreement proc-
ess moved from a
largely negative, "stop development" stance to a feeling of
being partners in the development process, advocating
their interests in affordable housing, for example. Also,
some developers gained respect for the city and its admin-
istrators.
Redistribution with Participation:
Chicago's Steel Task Force
When Harold Washington was elected Chicago's first
black mayor in 1983, he won partly because of a strong
neighborhood coalition convinced of the basic importance
of well-paying jobs to shore up neighborhood economies.
One of the biggest sources of jobs was the city's steel
industry, led by USX's South Works which was in the
process of imminent layoffs and perhaps closing, putting
ten thousand jobs at risk. Given USX's practices in other
locations like Youngstown and Pittsburgh, and conditions
in the steel industry in general, the city of Chicago, the
unions, and the neighborhoods were concerned and sought
a solution.
Washington's approach, through his Department of
Economic Development, was to appoint a task force to
study the situation and make recommendations. City rep-
resentatives were led by Stephen Alexander, a former steel
worker who had been active in the union movement and
was now a professional staffmember in the Department of
Economic Development. The task force could not have
worked if the city had tried to work with labor and manage-
ment representatives separately. The key move was to
include community and university representation. In addi-
tion to a number of community people, Washington ap-
pointed two faculty members from Northwestern Univer-
sity with a background in the steel industry. One of these,
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"Some of the citizens and city council members who en-
gaged in the taskforce and development agreementprocess
movedfrom a largely negative, 'stop development' stance to
a feeling of beingpartners in the developmentprocess ..."
Frank Cassell, a maverick ex-steel executive, was more
positive about the possibilities of producing steel profita-
bly in the United States than other executives. The other,
Ann Markusen, had recently completed a rather theoreti-
cal treatment of U.S. industrial policy, and was prepared to
look in-depth at the steel industry within that framework.
As it turned out, Markusen and Cassell were crucial to
the task force deliberations. Cassell was the more effective
communicator, but he avidly took in Markusen's more
academic studies and advocated her conclusions to the
larger group. Markusen, for her part, made two key contri-
butions. First, she
elaborated a theo-
retical construct
that justified the
city's hopes that
steel jobs could be
saved. The threat
to the industry,
she argued, was
not primarily for-
eign competition or the cost of local labor, but manage-
ment propensities to pull capital from viable enterprise in
favor of short term investments in other sectors. Second,
Markusen completed a detailed study of the inter-firm
linkages around steel production. Her study indicated that
in addition to ten thousand jobs directly in steel produc-
tion, the Chicago area had perhaps ten times that number
in related fabrication, supply and other specialties that
would be at risk once the primary producers withdrew.
Both conclusions reinforced the determination of the task
force, and undercut arguments for leaving decisions to the
private sector.
The city of Chicago's contribution was its ability to set up
a deliberative body with a composition that otherwise
would not have existed. The results of the task force have
been mixed. Some jobs were saved. Later the city pursued
a federally financed project which included retrainingsome
of the displaced steel workers. What is most notable was
the new set of ideas and perspectives gained from the task
force; participants later credited this with creating a "cul-
ture of interaction" which was previously nonexistent.
Conclusions
Perhaps three conclusions about these progressive cities
can be drawn from these examples.
First, although each experience sounds like a lesson
advocating cooperation, this was not the usual coopera-
tion. In each case there was a deliberate and successful
effort at inclusion before cooperation was attempted.
Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Chicago brought the most
profoundly opposing forces in society to the bargaining
table, when the prevailing institutions of society had re-
fused to grant the traditionally less powerful a legitimate
place. On the one side of the table were businessmen and
developers who saw their survival threatened. And, on the
other side, were representatives ofwhat had become mass
movements: Santa Monica and Berkeley's renter coali-
tions, Chicago's industrial unions, and various parts of the
neighborhood movement. These were renters, workers,
and homeowners whose basis for living was threatened, a
problem fueled by increasing inequalities in society at
large that im-
pacted these dif-
ferently com-
posed commu-
nity segments.
The leader-
ship of these
cities saw the
function of gov-
ernment as con-
necting these opposing forces and bringing them to the
table on equal terms. Once that happened, promising so-
lutions were devised to problems that had been avoided or
stalemated.
Second, these city experiences had two distinct parts: a
mass movement and a government part. Each were dis-
tinct, though a very delicate relationship existed between
the two. On the one hand, an independent movement was
an essential precondition before the city council or mayor
could effectively act on its behalf. On the other hand, while
the movement was necessary, it was not sufficient. Also
neededwas a new administrative style that couldwork with
it. In all of these cities this was emerging in one way or
another-a separate story.
City government could easily kill the movement. Too
many appointments ofmovement leaders to cityjobs—thus
stripping leaders from movement organizations-was one
of the quickest ways to do this; and the wrong kind of
support at thewrong time, was another. Butwhat was most
impressive was how the cities learned to nurture these
mass movements.
Finally, are these isolated cases that have no relevance
for other cities or even for each other? This has been sug-
gested. The mass movement part ofthe progressive city has
been rather common over the past decade or so as have
many of the specific governmental innovations. What is
rare, however, is the combination of the two. It is possible
that even this full blown form of the progressive city will
increase in numbers. The underlying inequalities suggest
an increase; and the recent cases in Santa Monica, Berkeley,
and Chicago are considerable.
